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MORAL TRUTH AND THE LAW: A NEW
LOOK AT AN OLD LINK
Daniel J Morrissey*
Of lawe there can be no lesse acknowledged, then that her seate is the
bosome of God, her voyce the harmony of the world.
Richard Hooker1
Rarely does one hear it said that law is a reflection of an objective jus-
tice or the ultimate meaning or purpose of life. Usually it is thought to
reflect at best the community sense of what is expedient; and more com-
monly it is thought to express the more or less arbitrary will of the
lawmaker.
Harold J. Berman2
I. INTRODUCTION: LAW, JUSTICE, AND MORAL
SATISFACTION
have come a long way from Richard Hooker's late medieval
l outlook to the views that Harold Berman describes as controlling
• • today. We now speak of lawyers as "problem solvers" and say
that the purpose of law is to "resolve disputes." There is, however, a wide-
spread dissatisfaction with our legal system, rooted perhaps in a shared sense
that the law is no longer connected to its essential purpose-justice.
This disillusionment is hardly a surprise. Can the law command much
popular respect if it is considered nothing more than rules of expediency or a
justification for arbitrary power? Such an attitude also makes it difficult for
ethically sensitive people to practice law. Must lawyers limit their profes-
sional goals to the hired gun syndrome-just making a good living by
manipulating the rules of law to serve their clients' ends?
* Professor, University of Tulsa School of Law; A.B., Georgetown University, 1971;
J.D., Georgetown University, 1974.
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1. Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity 142 (Folger Library ed., 1977)
(1593). A contemporary commentator aptly sums up the gist of Hooker's jurisprudence: "The
dynamism in the structure and unity of Hooker's thesis lies in his conception of law as a
reflection of the Maker of Law." C.M.A. McCauliff, Law as a Principle of Reform: Reflections
from Sixteenth-Century England, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 429, 438 (1988).
2. Harold J. Berman, The Crisis of Legal Education in America, 26 B.C. L. REV. 347,
349 (1985).
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Perhaps that is all one can expect in a legal career, but it isn't an attractive
way of life for people who seek moral satisfaction in their work.3 Such lim-
ited possibilities will also frustrate beginning lawyers and law students4 who
enter the profession motivated, at least in part, by a "deep and durable de-
mand for justice." 5
There is, however, a tradition in jurisprudence that links law to a worthier
purpose. Hooker, with Renaissance flourish, called it "the harmony of the
world."'6 Law, in this view, must be based on moral truths; it must serve
proper human ends. Justice Anthony Kennedy expressed that broader out-
look recently when, speaking without notes, he delivered these remarks at an
ABA dinner: "We must never lose sight of the fact that the law has a moral
foundation, and we must never fail to ask ourselves not only what the law is,
but what the law should be.",7 But to establish this relationship of law to
justice we must answer certain fundamental questions. Is there such a thing
as moral truth? If so, what are its principles and how can we know them?
And, ultimately, can they underwrite our laws?
This Article begins by noting how those issues are present in comments
from a recent Supreme Court case. It then reviews the troubling philosophic
and jurisprudential theories that have divorced law from any such founda-
tion in ethics. The Article concludes by discussing three contemporary
moral philosophers whose refreshing ideas can lead us back in the opposite
direction, toward the restoration of a justice-based theory of law.
3. Pope John Paul II, in his encyclical letter On Human Work 1 (1981), aptly expressed
that goal:
Through work man must earn his daily bread and contribute to the continual
advance of science and technology and, above all, to elevating unceasingly the
cultural and moral level of the society within which he lives in community with
those who belong to the same family.
4. Dean Cramton describes the prevailing attitude that awaits students who begin law
school:
Modern dogmas entangle legal education-a moral relativism tending toward
nihilism, a pragmatism tending toward amoral instrumentalism, a realism tend-
ing toward cynicism, an individualism tending toward atomism, and a faith in
reason and democratic process tending toward mere credulity and idolatry.
Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC.
247, 262 (1978).
5. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1316 (1976) (Professor Chayes uses this quote to defend the legitimacy of settling public
issues by the process of adjudication).
A recent ABA report notes: "Many profess to select a legal career because of important
moral, political or social values, and view a legal career as an opportunity to contribute to
society." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFES-
SION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTIN-
UUM 226 (1992).
The same report states that the students' expectations change between entering law school
and graduation. It also notes a rise in lawyer dissatisfaction. Id. at 227-28.
6. HOOKER, supra note 1, at 142.
7. Richard C. Reuben, Man in the Middle, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1992, at 35 (quoting re-
marks by Justice Kennedy at an American Bar Association dinner).
An ancient authority made the same point even more bluntly: "Remove justice and what
are kingdoms but gangs of criminals on a large scale." ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 139
(Penguin Classics 1984) (412 A.D.).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT'S BRUSH WITH MORAL TRUTH
A. OVERTURNING A WRONGLY-DECIDED CASE
In the recent plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,8 Justices
O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy found it necessary to explain when the
Supreme Court would be justified in overruling a precedent. 9 Among other
decisions contrary to the rule of stare decisis, the Justices cited Brown v.
Board of Education.'0 There the Court abandoned the separate-but-equal
doctrine it had condoned almost sixty years earlier in Plessy v. Ferguson.II
Plessy held that legislatively mandated racial segregation did not violate the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Planned Parenthood plurality noted that the Court in Plessy had re-
jected the argument that "the enforced separation of the two races stamps
the colored race with a badge of inferiority." 12 Justices O'Connor, Souter,
and Kennedy then went on to give these reasons for Brown's reversal of
Plessy:
While we think Plessy was wrong the day it was decided.., we must also
recognize that the Plessy Court's explanation for its decision was so
clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the Court in 1954 that the
decision to reexamine Plessy was on this ground alone not only justified
but required. 13
Why did the Planned Parenthood plurality comment that the Plessy decision
was always wrong if the ostensible reason for its reversal was "the facts ap-
parent to the Court in 1954?" As the Chief Justice noted in his dissent in
Planned Parenthood,'4 the inequality inherent in legislated segregation was
pointed out to the Court in Plessy. In fact, one Justice, John Harlan, based
his dissent on it.15
By acknowledging that Plessy was never right, the Planned Parenthood
plurality was perhaps recognizing what really happened in Brown. The facts
of segregation and their consequences had not changed in sixty years. The
Court simply came to understand something that had been true all along,
that racial segregation was wrong and contrary to enduring American
values.
The comments of the Planned Parenthood plurality reveal how founda-
tional questions about morality underlie legal issues. Since that is the case,
the remarks of one contemporary philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre, describe
what should be our ultimate inquiry: "Those of us who see constitutional
8. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
9. The precedent in question was Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which guaranteed a
woman's right to abortion.
10. Planned Parenthood, 112 S. Ct. at 2798 (citing Brown 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
11. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In reality, Plessy did not require that equal facilities be provided
to those suffering racial segregation. It was three years later in Cumming v. Board of Educ.,
175 U.S. 528 (1899), a case upholding a whites-only high school, that the Court first appeared
to mandate that the state also provide a similar facility for black children.
12. Planned Parenthood, 112 S. Ct. at 2813 (citing Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551).
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 2865.
15. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 562.
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questions [as] questions [of] political morality [must] address the problem of
moral knowledge. Is there moral knowledge? Of what does it consist? How
is it achieved?" 16
B. ETHICAL ASSERTIONS AND SKEPTICAL REPLIES
At the deepest level, the concept of moral truth arises in each person's
search for meaning. It supposes that each of us can find satisfying answers
to questions like: "Are some ways of life better than others?" or "What is
the point of doing anything?" In addition, if one accepts the basic Aristote-
lian insight that humans can thrive and flourish only in a community, moral
philosophy must be more than a personal matter. Humans must devise some
standards for their life together that promote the common good. In other
words, laws must be based on moral truth.
But those assertions are open to a hostile response implicit in Berman's
epigram that began this Article. How can a notion of justice or the common
good ever be more than a meaningless abstraction, a lofty-sounding way to
mask personal or group preferences? For instance, the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment seems to suppose that there is a real,
objective norm of equality, but is there? If the skeptic is right, there is no
such thing as truth, only individual opinions about what is right and wrong.
Or perhaps the most we can say is that a standard like equality is relative to
a culture; it can only be defined by the beliefs of particular groups at particu-
lar times.
Applying that critique to the plurality's comments in Planned Parenthood,
a skeptic might argue that the Brown Court invalidated segregation simply
because the Justices in that case found the practice personally distasteful. A
cultural relativist would put it a bit differently. She would see the Brown
Court as basing its decision on the collective opinion of American society in
1954 that the practice of segregation had to be ended.
We may assume that a majority of the Supreme Court and perhaps of
American society as well held a different attitude about race relations in
1896 than they did in 1954 or in 1992. Did the Planned Parenthood plurality
therefore have any warrant to criticize Plessy, to say that segregation was
just as wrong in 1896 as it was in 1954? Perhaps the Justices were only
stating their current dislike for the practice as it existed then. Alternatively,
they could have been merely expressing the negative view of racial segrega-
tion held by the consensus of American society in 1992.
C. MORAL OBJECTIVITY AS LEGAL GROUNDING
If Justice Kennedy is to be taken at his word, however, one suspects that
at least he (and probably Justices O'Connor and Souter as well) was de-
nouncing racial segregation as wrong even at the time of Plessy. What then
16. Alasdair MacIntyre, Moral Arguments and Social Contexts, 80 J. PHIL. 590, 591
(1983).
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made that practice objectionable in 1896 even though most Americans at
that time presumably saw no moral or legal problem with it?
One can surmise that the Planned Parenthood Justices would answer that
racial segregation always violated the Equal Protection Clause when it is
understood in the light of certain principles that the Plessy Court had failed
to grasp. As one commentator noted, this method of constitutional interpre-
tation is as old as our Republic: "For the generation that framed the Consti-
tution, the concept of a 'higher law,' protecting 'natural rights' and taking
precedence over ordinary positive law as a matter of political obligation, was
widely shared and deeply felt."17
Of late, much of the Court's description of these higher principles has had
a ring of cultural relativism to it. The Justices have found certain rights
premised on "the basic values that underlie our society," 18 or "rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people . . . ."19 Yet one senses that the
Supreme Court is often reaching for an even deeper grounding for its impor-
tant decisions. The Court has spoken of "those fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institu-
tions."'20 And it has created standards like "the decencies of civilized con-
duct" 21 and "a scheme of ordered liberty" 22 to give meaning to our "living
Constitution. ' 23 As Justice Brennan noted in a case involving the rights of
foster parents, "the liberty interest ... has its source, and its contours are
17. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 715
(1975). An early example of this attitude is the comment of Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Daln.) 386, 388 (1798), that governmental power was constrained not just by the federal
and state constitutions but by natural law as well.
See also Stephen Macedo, Morality and the Constitution: Toward a Synthesis for "Earth-
bound" Interpreters, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 29, 32 (1992) (noting that the Constitution speaks in
general moral concepts, for example, "equal protection of the laws," which "call upon inter-
preters to bring critical moral thinking to bear on the task of construction").
18. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
19. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). Justice Frankfurter was a bit more
explicit about the source of his ultimate judicial values in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947), where he stated that judicial review meant that the Court should scrutinize the whole
course of the proceedings to determine "whether they offend those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples ...... Id at 67
(emphasis added).
20. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272
U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
21. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952). As noted Constitutional commenta-
tors have put it: "Little more can be said to accurately describe the nature of a fundamental
right, because fundamental rights analysis is simply no more than the modern recognition of
the natural law concepts first espoused by Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull." JOHN E. NOWAK
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 367 (3d ed. 1986) (citation omitted).
For some thoughts on how a court might find objective criteria to define this standard of
"fundamental fairness," see Sanford Kaddish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adju-
dication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 344-63 (1957).
22. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
23. In his dissent in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), Justice Brennan gave
one of his most eloquent explanations of that ideal. He noted that there are "great constitu-
tional concepts (like liberty and property) ... purposely left to gather meaning from experi-
ence." Id. at 138 (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571
(1972)). He then cited a number of landmark cases where the Court overturned accepted
practices by finding constitutional rights that had not been "traditionally protected by our
society," for example, the right of married couples to use contraception (Griswold v. Connecti-
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ordinarily to be sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights as they
have been understood in 'this nation's history and tradition.' "24
One can ask, then, if the Planned Parenthood plurality was using Ameri-
can or human values to condemn segregation. Perhaps, like Justice Bren-
nan, they were basing their judgment on both. Either way, the Justices were
claiming to know moral truth and they were applying it to a time outside
their own.
D. EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES
Questions about moral judgments and their worth as foundations for legal
rules are therefore epistemological: They ultimately depend on our being
able to establish theories of how we can know things. How can we say, for
instance, that racial segregation was as wrong in 1896 as it was in 1954? Is it
possible to assert that value statements like that are intrinsically true? The
presuppositions that have held sway for decades in Anglo-American philoso-
phy have unfortunately answered that such claims are indefensible. 25
This dominant outlook, called non-cognitivism, maintains that all moral
statements lack truth status. There is nothing that can make ethical asser-
tions true, it says, in the way that propositions about empirical facts can be
verified by reference to material objects. 26 When it comes to validating theo-
ries of knowledge then, modem philosophy has given us a fact/value dichot-
omy. Ethical statements are consequently said to be nothing more than
opinions, conveying the subjective preferences of certain individuals and
groups.27 As a result, all prescriptive intellectual discourse, including legal
theory, is haunted by skepticism, relativism, and nihilism. Everything is up
for grabs.
Mark Tushnet, a leading thinker of the Critical Legal Studies School,
sums up this attitude well. He concedes that a world without rights or any
real meaning may be "Kafkaesque," but he nevertheless accepts that as an
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)) and the right of children to be free from corporal punishment in
schools (Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)). Id. at 139.
The Court's purpose, Brennan said, must not be to discern whether an interest has been
traditionally protected by our society, but to give tradition its full scope by pointing out if the
rationale for the conventional rule has changed over the years. Id. at 140.
24. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (citation omitted)
(quoting in part Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)); see also Meachum
v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
25. SABINA LOVIBOND, REALISM & IMAGINATION IN ETHICS 1 (1983).
26. Id. at 17-23; see also Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 1061, 1086-88
(1982).
27. As a leading non-cognitivist wrote:
There cannot be such a thing as ethical science, if by ethical science one means
the elaboration of a "true" system of morals. For we have seen that, as ethical
judgments are mere expressions of feeling, there can be no way of determining
the validity of any ethical system, and indeed, no sense in asking whether any
such system is true. All that one may legitimately enquire in this connection is,
What are the moral habits of a given person or group of people, and what causes
them to have precisely those habits and feelings? And this enquiry falls wholly
within the scope of the existing social sciences.
ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND LOGIC 112 (2d ed. 1952).
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apt description of contemporary life. Such a state may be distasteful to
some, he says, "[b]ut the point of modernism is precisely that that is just the
way things are these days."2
Well, things are not as bleak as that, at least according to three current
philosophers who are convincingly bucking the non-cognitivist trend. The
thrust of this Article will be to present their views as groundings for a jus-
tice-based theory of law. Before that, however, this Article offers a brief
digest of the philosophical origins of non-cognitivism. It describes how
those theories have supposedly disconnected legal theory from moral philos-
ophy. The result has been the reigning orthodoxies of our modern legal sys-
tem: positivism and liberal individualism (liberalism).
Contrary to a jurisprudence based on moral truth, both positivism and
liberalism insist on a value-free legal system. Positivism holds that law
should be separated from morality. Liberalism urges that the legal system
must only be a neutral framework in which each person can pursue his or
her own vision of the good.
III. THE MAKING OF MODERN LEGAL THOUGHT
A. THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF NON-COGNITIVISM
Modern philosophy is appropriately said to have begun with a doubt. At
the beginning of the scientific era in the early seventeenth century, French
philosopher Rene Descartes exemplified the inquisitive spirit of his age. He
resolved to question the existence of everything that he could not be certain
was true.29 This led him to the radical position of doubting all that he per-
ceived except the experience of his own mind thinking.30 Descartes came to
terms with his disbelief by claiming innate knowledge of the existence of a
good God. That deity, Descartes felt, would surely not deceive him about
the reality of objects that he clearly and distinctly perceived. 31 Later philos-
ophers, however, continued to pursue the subjective and skeptical method
that Descartes originally proposed.
The seventeenth and early eighteenth century British empiricists John
Locke and George Berkeley argued that humans can have no direct knowl-
edge of any material substances, only an awareness of the ideas in their own
minds.32 They set the stage for the eighteenth century Scottish-born philos-
opher David Hume who pushed epistemology to its most skeptical reaches.
Hume followed the empiricists in disclaiming any direct knowledge of an
28. Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies, 36 J. LEGAL ED. 505, 516-17 (1986).
29. RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD 118 (Margaret D. Wilson ed., New
American Library 1969) (1637).
30. Id. at 128.
31. Id. at 131-32. For a lucid explanation of Descartes's revolutionary approach, see
ANTHONY FLEW, PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 61-68 (1980).
32. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Peter H. Nid-
ditch ed., 1975) (1700); GEORGE BERKELEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
(Penguin ed., 1988) (1710); see also FLEW, supra note 31, at 68-79.
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objective world.33 He went even further, however, to doubt that there is any
necessity to the conjunction of events that humans commonly explain by the
terms cause and effect. 34
Hume carried this agnosticism into moral matters. He questioned how
ethical conclusions can ever be drawn from purely factual observations. 35 A
description of what is the case, he argued, can never compel one to behave in
a certain way.36 In other words, moral discourse can never go from an "is"
to an "ought." 37
Consistent with that outlook, Hume disavowed the role of reason in con-
trolling human affairs. 38 All motivation, he said, comes from the passions,
not reason, which can only act instrumentally in helping the passions secure
what they desire. As Hume put it in his famous dictum, "Reason is and
ought only to be the slave of the passions." '39
In other parts of his writings, however, Hume appeared to be anything but
a nihilist. At times, he seemed the spokesman for a worldly common sense
and advocated adherence to accepted modes of behavior. 40 In addition,
while claiming to reject objective moral norms, he somewhat paradoxically
recognized the worth of certain universal human sentiments such as
sympathy. 4'
Immanuel Kant, who wrote immediately after Hume, was profoundly
troubled by his predecessor's pervasive skepticism. 42 Yet Kant was also dis-
trustful of contemporary rationalist theories that claimed humans are en-
dowed with innate mental faculties that give them a priori knowledge of
reality.43
As an escape from that conundrum, Kant offered a blended epistemology.
He agreed with the empiricists that all knowledge originates in the senses.
He went on, however, to assert that the mind has a certain pre-existing clas-
sification system that it uses to synthesize the raw data of experience and
make it understandable. These mental structures include such concepts as
"substance," "causation," "space," and "time." By using these categories,
33. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 238 (Ernest C. Mossner ed., 1985)
(1739); see FLEW, supra note 31, at 79.
34. HUME, supra note 33, at 121-31; see ROGER SCRUTON, FROM DESCARTES TO
WITTGENSTEIN 124-26 (1981).
35. HUME, supra note 33, at 507-21.
36. Id. at 521.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 462.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., id. at 529-65. But see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH
RATIONALITY? 298 (1988) (describing Hume's conventional morality as one where "rank,
property, and pride structure social exchange").
41. HUME, supra note 33, at 550-51.
42. FLEW, supra note 31, at 49 (quoting Kant's famous acknowledgement that Hume had
"woken me from my dogmatic slumbers"); see SCRUTON, supra note 34, at 138-39.
43. For a succinct discussion of those rationalist systems put forth by Leibniz and Spi-
noza, see FLEW, supra note 31, at 106-10. Flew notes that Kant deftly exposed the fallacy of
their attempt to deductively prove actual existence from mere existence in thought by contrast-
ing "100 possible thalers [dollars] with 100 real thalers.... ruefully reflecting that nothing but
the latter would improve his [Kant's] financial position." Id. at 105.
[Vol. 47
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Kant asserted, humans can go beyond merely experiencing random sense
impressions. They can have valid scientific knowledge of the world."
Kant is also renowned for his response to Hume's ethical agnosticism.
Although Kant believed that the human mind is not capable of direct, tran-
scendental knowledge, 45 he did hold that there are objective grounds for cer-
tain ethical rules. According to Kant, there is a moral dimension to the
human condition that flows from our status as rational agents.46 It demands
ultimately that we treat each other with fairness. Kant called his grand
norm the categorical imperative and stated it several ways, including this
well-known prescription: "Act only on that maxim by which you can at the
same time will that it should become a universal law."'47
B. THE HERITAGE OF UTILITARIANISM
Kant thus submitted the ethical consciousness of each individual as a re-
sponse to Hume's moral skepticism. But a contemporaneous British philos-
opher, Jeremy Bentham, accepted Hume's passion-driven theory of human
behavior and created a socio-political system based on it. Bentham's theory,
which he called utilitarianism, postulated that the ultimate goal of a society
should be to maximize the pleasure and minimize the pain of its members.48
That principle, he said, could resolve every issue of public policy by mandat-
ing that government always act to produce the greatest happiness for the
greatest number.
Bentham's hedonistic calculus was radically egalitarian. It sought only to
quantify human preferences and admitted no qualitative differences in those
desires.49 It is not hard to see how the non-cognitivists with their skeptical
and subjective approach to morality are the offspring of Hume and Bentham.
The leading thinker of utilitarianism's next generation, John Stuart Mill,
sought to refine Bentham's theory by proposing a regime of higher and lower
pleasures, some by definition more worthy than others.50 For Mill, the judg-
ments of those who had experienced diverse pleasures would be dispositive
of their qualitative rank. Mill also tempered utilitarianism's index of general
happiness with a Kantian respect for personal autonomy. Humans, he said,
ought to be afforded the greatest amount of freedom to satisfy their individ-
ual desires. When this leads to conflict, Mill proposed the somewhat superfi-
44. HUMPHREY PALMER, KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, AN INTRODUCTORY
TEXT (1983) (1781); see also SCRUTON, supra note 34, at 137-48.
45. PALMER, supra note 44; see IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON
(Lewis W. Beck ed., 1949) (1788).
46. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 13-15 (Robert
P. Wolff ed., 1969) (1785). Kant's poetic closing remarks to his CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL
REASON are also relevant here: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admi-
ration and awe, the oftener and more steadily they are reflected on: the starry heavens above
me and the moral law within me." KANT, supra note 42, at 258.
47. KANT, supra note 46, at 44.
48. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 3 (Hafner Press
ed., 1948) (1780).
49. Id. at 29-32.
50. JOHN S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRE-
SENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 8-9 (H.B. Action ed., 1972) (1863).
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cial notion of harm to others as the only legitimate check on human action.5 1
Despite Mill's hierarchy of pleasures and his libertarian bow to individual
freedom, the classic utilitarian formula for justice continued to be simple. In
making social policy, the lawgiver need only aggregate the desires of all
members of society. If certain values held by a minority of citizens are odi-
ous to the larger part of the political community, they can logically be disre-
garded as inimical to the general welfare.52
C. THE RIGHTS REACTION
In response to this strong majoritarian strain in utilitarianism, liberal indi-
vidualism has emerged as an influential countervailing foundation for legal
rules. This jurisprudence of "rights" sees each person as having certain par-
amount claims that take precedence over any action advocated on behalf of
the common good. 53 Because of the dignity of each person as a rational
moral agent, the law must have a Kantian preference, liberal individualists
say, for respecting individual desires. 54
Legal principles are therefore to be crafted with an eye to resolving indi-
vidual conflicts, not to promoting any notion of the common good. For the
liberal individualist, law serves as a "neutral framework." It exists to create
a state of affairs where each person can pursue his or her own chosen ends
with as much freedom as can be permitted to secure that liberty for all
others. 55
Egalitarian liberals would distribute the riches of society as evenly as pos-
sible to afford each individual the greatest chance for self-fulfillment. 56
Others in this general school, however, would resist such policies of coerced
sharing on the theory that they negate each person's ability to maintain the
wealth that he earns. 57 Both of these strains of contemporary liberalism,
however, hold that the law ought to promote individual autonomy over any
notion of the general welfare.
D. POSITIVISM CENTERSTAGE
Legal positivism shares this value-neutral spirit of liberal individualism
and grew hand-in-hand with it as a jurisprudential corollary. 58 Positivism
51. Id. at 143.
52. SCRUTON, supra note 34, at 229.
53. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 2-3 (1984).
54. As a leading contemporary proponent of this outlook puts it: "Each person possesses
an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override."
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-4 (1971).
Another renowned advocate of liberalism put his quarrel with utilitarianism quite bluntly:
"The constructive portions [of this book] emphasize an idea that is also part of the liberal
tradition.... This is the old idea of human rights. Bentham called that idea 'nonsense on
stilts."' RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY vii (1977).
55. SANDEL, supra note 53, at 4.
56. See RAWLS, supra note 54.
57. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
58. But see DWORKIN, supra note 54 (arguing that legal positivism is ultimately incom-
patible with the moral notion of human rights upon which liberalism is based).
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defines law starkly as a command of the sovereign; 59 the morality of a partic-
ular legal rule in no way affects its juridical status.
In the modem era, the seventeenth-century political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes gave one of the earliest justifications for this attitude. Hobbes saw
humans as interminably selfish and quarrelsome.60 Therefore, only a sover-
eign with absolute power can secure civil peace. 61 Everyone must surrender
to its authority, no matter how arbitrary. To allow humans to resist the
sovereign's commands as unjust, would only, Hobbes feared, give them a
pretext to dissolve society into anarchy.62
Bentham was also a precursor of positivism. He denigrated any notion of
justice that went contrary to his theory of social welfare. Since legislation
was Bentham's means to achieve his happy state of utility, he recognized no
limits whatsoever on parliamentary sovereignty.63
It was, however, Bentham's nineteenth-century disciple John Austin who
created positivism as an analytical school. 64 Austin accepted Bentham's the-
ories of social welfare. But he rigidly separated those ethical notions from
the study of law, which, he argued, should be carried out without regard to
its moral content.65 Austin advocated that jurisprudence be treated as a sci-
ence whose only concern would be to understand the common features that
characterize mature legal systems.66
Austin may have given us the study of law as a separate subject from
morality, but it was the distinguished Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes who drove that difference into the practical consciousness of Ameri-
can jurisprudence. Holmes, an avowed skeptic,67 looked pragmatically at
the law as mere "prophecies of what the courts will do in fact."168
Holmes's positivism was blunt and full-blown. He wrote candidly: "When
59. EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 97 (1974).
60. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 81-82 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1946) (1651). Among
Hobbes's memorable comments on that point are:
So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First,
competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory .... Hereby it is manifest, that
during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they
are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man,
against every man.
Id.
61. Id. at 112.
62. Id. at 211.
63. BODENHEIMER, supra note 59, at 86-87.
64. Id. at 96. See generally W.L. MORISON, JOHN AUSTIN (1982).
65. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 126 (H.L.A. Hart
ed., 1954) (1832). A contemporary commentator has pointedly restated the essential thrust of
Austin's jurisprudence:
He [Austin] ... does refer ... to the natural law of the moderns, and says it
ought to be thrown out of jurisprudence, along with the classical notions, be-
cause of its dependence on nonsense about moral sense.
MORISON, supra note 64, at 77.
66. BODENHEIMER, supra note 59, at 96-97.
67. Id. at 123. For a sharp critique of Holmes's ethical agnosticism and its effect on
American legal theory in the early twentieth century, see Francis E. Lucey, S.J., Natural Law
and American Legal Realism: Their Respective Contributions to a Theory of Law in a Demo-
cratic Society, 30 GEO. L.J. 493 (1942).
68. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173 (1920).
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it comes to the development of a corpus juris, the ultimate question is what
do the dominant forces of the community want and do they want it hard
enough to disregard whatever inhibitions may stand in the way."' 69 Holmes
allowed that moral principles had shaped the development of the law, but he
regarded them as only reflecting the value preferences of the leading ele-
ments coincident in society. In his opinion, it would be a distinct advance if
"every word of moral significance could be banished from the law
altogether."'70
E. INPUT FROM THE LEGAL REALISTS
Yet Holmes also stated his distrust of the formal underpinnings of laws,
urging that legal rules be constantly re-evaluated in the light of contempo-
rary concerns. 71 He was advocating, in essence, that law serve human needs
and that it be based on flexible, human-centered principles. If Holmes was
at heart a moralist, he did not acknowledge it. But his call to examine the
practical effects of particular laws did inspire a group of scholars in the early
decades of this century who came to be known as the "Legal Realists."
'72
The Realists studied both the process of adjudication and its impact on
society. That led them to distrust the controlling force of legal rules.
Courts, the Realists found, purported to apply precedent to cases before
them, but their legal reasoning often resulted in a skewed syllogism. Most
legal opinions really had more to do with a judge's hunch than the applica-
tion of a legal rule to a particular state of facts.73 The Realists therefore
sought to expose and examine the unarticulated premises and felt necessities
that actually shaped legal decisions. 74 The Legal Realists, like Holmes,
would probably resist being described as moralists, but many of them were
political activists with agenda for dealing with the complexities of a chang-
ing economic order. All of their talk of policy and new legal models was in
reality nothing more than the application of humanistic values to the indus-
trial conditions that were transforming twentieth-century America.7 5
69. BODENHEIMER, supra note 59, at 123 (quoting Letter to John Wu, in HOLMES' BOOK
NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETrERS AND PAPERS 187 (H.C. Shriver ed., 1936)).
70. HOLMES, supra note 68, at 179.
71. Id. at 186-87.
72. See generally MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1870-1960, at 169-246 (1992). The author notes, "Legal Realism was neither a coherent intel-
lectual movement nor a consistent or systematic jurisprudence. It expressed more an intellec-
tual mood than a clear body of tenets, more a set of sometimes contradictory tendencies than a
rigorous set of methodologies or propositions about legal theory." Id. at 169.
73. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929).
74. For the foremost example of this application of psychology to law, see JEROME
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). It has been called "the most popular and
widely read piece of Realist literature." HORWITZ, supra note 72, at 175-76.
75. See Tushnet, supra note 28, at 507. But see Martin P. Golding, Jurisprudence and
Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century America-Major Themes and Developments, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 441 (1986). "Realist writings smack of 'scientism,' with its assumption that
scientific investigation alone can answer normative questions .... " Id. at 453; accord James
Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 685, 700 (1985) (accusing the Legal Realists of having a "technocratic consciousness").
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Legal Realism thus came to temper liberal-positivism and that strange
amalgam has dominated the workings of the American legal system in the
post-war era. One also hears on occasion a new version of utilitarianism,
that legal rules should be designed to promote economic efficiency by maxi-
mizing the value preferences of individuals. 76 If there is a morality to the
law today, it is this overriding ethic of individualism, moderated only by
vague invocations of public policy.
Along those lines, some commentators have issued rather hesitant invita-
tions for new forms of legitimacy that might give legal theory a "logic of
appropriateness." 77 Perhaps there is a groping there toward what two illus-
trious legal scholars have called a "politics of virtue."7 8 Yet there has been
no real effort to place the law on a more convincing normative footing.
IV. THE DOMINANT CRITICS
A. PUBLIC APOSTASY
In the last ten or fifteen years, we have seen a willingness among certain
prominent academic lawyers to break from the reigning orthodoxy of posi-
tivism and liberalism. They have openly acknowledged the foundational ag-
nosticism of that system and forthrightly embraced the legal equivalent of
nihilism 79 or ethical relativism.80 Making a virtue of necessity they say: "If
modern philosophy has given us life without any intrinsic meaning, then let
the law respond by understanding itself solely as a creative exercise in
human self-definition."
81
76. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d. ed. 1986). The
author does concede that "[t]he term efficiency, when used as in this book to denote that
allocation of resources in which value is maximized, has limitations as an ethical criterion of
social decisionmaking---although perhaps not serious ones, as such examples are very rare."
Id. at 12; see also ROBIN P. MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS (1990).
77. Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Future of Legal Scholarship and the Search for a Modern
Theory of Law, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 404 (1986).
78. Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and
Abortion, 24 GA. L. REv. 923 (1991).
79. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 171 (1988) (stating "[w]hat
gives twentieth-century modernism its particular identity is its brutal washing, in what Holmes
called 'cynical acid,' of many of the fondest tenets of preceding eras, including a confidence
about the ability to grasp 'truth' "). But see John Stick, Can Nihilism be Pragmatic?, 100
HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986) (noting that "[n]ihilism is too strong a skeptical theory to be held
consistently at all times. Every author who uses nihilist criticisms against others at times
makes definite statements about law and so falls out of nihilism"). Accord Daniel C.K. Chow,
Trashing Nihilism, 65 TUL. L. REV. 221 (1990), who comments:
Carried to their furthest limits, the nihilists' skeptical arguments deny the possi-
bility of any type of moral or legal knowledge as well as the possibility of any
type of objective knowledge at all... [t]he nihilists must ultimately retreat from
the extreme limits of their position and admit unjustified beliefs. By asserting
unjustified beliefs, the nihilist also re-admits all that he tried to vanquish: the
possibility of reason and knowledge as legitimate guides to human conduct.
Id at 293.
80. See, e.g., MICHAEL PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 38-54 (1988); see also
Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New
Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (1987).
81. Most writers of the Critical Legal Studies school are more or less committed to that
project. See Tushnet, supra note 28 and accompanying text; see also THE POLITICS OF LAW, A
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B. PHILOSOPHICAL AND LITERARY SUPPORT
There are obvious soundings of Nietzsche8 2 and the post-war existential-
ists83 in those jurists. Their thought, however, most readily reflects the influ-
ence of one reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein,84 a major philosopher in the
first half of this century. In his attack on traditional philosophy, especially
platonic epistemology, Wittgenstein appeared to follow the skeptical path of
Descartes and Hume by refusing to recognize external reality as the basis for
any certain knowledge. He found truth only in particular "language games"
or "forms of life." 85
Some have thus used Wittgenstein's thought as a basis for cultural relativ-
ism. One of his contemporary disciples, Richard Rorty, has presented a
thoughtful justification for this epistemology. For Rorty, it is a mistake to
assume that our thoughts, as expressed in language, correspond to nature.
All human knowledge is instead mediated exclusively through culturally
conditioned paradigms, that is, through some humanly constructed
framework.86
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 1982); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES (1987); Louis B. Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-
Land, 36 STAN. L. REV. 413 (1984).
That aspiration however is expressed most eloquently in the writings of Roberto M. Unger.
See ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS V (1975) (dedicating his work to pro-
ducing "a kind of thought and society that does not yet and may never exist").
Roberto M. Unger's more recent writings include LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976); The
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983); PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PER-
SONALITY (1984) [hereinafter PASSION]; and POLITICS: A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL
THEORY (1987).
For lucid discussions of Unger's complex work, see Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J.
Monahan, The "Rights" Stuff Roberto Unger and Beyond, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1477 (1984) and
Symposium, Roberto Unger's Politics: A Work in Constructive Social Theory, 81 Nw. U. L.
REV. 589 (1987).
82. See NIETZSCHE As POSTMODERNIST, ESSAYS PRO AND CONTRA (Clayton Koelb ed.,
1990).
83. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM & HUMANISM (Philip Mairet trans., 1977)
(1948). Sartre puts the case for total human freedom most starkly:
Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence
forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside
himself. He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed exist-
ence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference
to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism-
man is free, man is freedom.
Id. at 33-34.
84. Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy is complex and susceptible to various interpreta-
tions. Of his two major works, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (1922) and PHILOSOPHI-
CAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1953), the latter appears to repudiate much
of what is written in the former.
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein declared that the purpose of all philosophy was to criticize
language so that thoughts could be clarified. But in Philosophical Investigations he stated that
he was no longer interested in analyzing propositions, but asserted that the only legitimate
interest of philosophy should be to describe the actual use of language. BODENHEIMER, supra
note 59, at 108.
For a lucid discussion of Wittgenstein's basic ideas, see LOVIBOND, supra note 25; see also
infra, notes 135, 145 and accompanying text.
85. This appears to be the understanding of Williams, supra note 80, at 453-54 (describing
the epistemological predicate for the Critical Legal Studies movement).
86. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
[Vol. 47
MORAL TRUTH AND THE LAW
In its vulgar form, the ethical consequences of this approach are startling.
All values are relative to the language or thought patterns that create them.
Change a culture and you can change truth. The literary parallel to this
relativistic spirit in philosophy is known as Deconstructionism. It denies
that a text has any meaning beyond what its readers bring to it. 87 Writings
therefore hold no inherent message, only possibilities of interpretation.
Deconstructionism can be taken hand-in-hand with its philosophical
counterpart to support a pervasive skepticism toward legal theory. For in-
stance, the terms of a document like the United States Constitution are seen
by the Deconstructionists as totally open-ended and susceptible to whatever
meaning certain individuals may give them.88 Legal rules are ultimately in-
determinate and can therefore be manipulated to support any result.89
C. CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
The most vibrant legal scholarship inspired by these schools of modern
philosophy and literary criticism has been the Critical Legal Studies move-
ment (CLS or Crits).90 In the late 1970s and the 80s, the Crits took up the
agenda of Holmes and the Legal Realists, making it their work to expose the
latent political interests underlying supposedly value-neutral rules of law.91
The ambitious agenda of CLS writers is thus to evaluate the existing order
from an adversarial perspective. They have worked to lay bare all human
arrangements as merely arbitrary social constructs having no pre-ordained
justification.92 The ultimate rationale for all law is purely political.93 Legal
87. A basic work in this area is STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980).
For a general application of this principle of interpretivism to law, see Gary Peller, The Meta-
physics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1152 (1985). This creation of meaning, however,
can be a communal rather than a purely individualistic experience. See Stephen M. Feldman,
The New Metaphysics: The Interpretive Turn in Jurisprudence, 76 IOWA L. REV. 661 (1991).
88. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the
Under-Aged President, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 250 (1989) (explaining how the constitutional man-
date that the president be at least 35 years old could be reinterpreted to allow someone
younger to assume that office). See generally LEVINSON, supra note 79.
89. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phe-
nomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
90. See also supra notes 28, 81 and accompanying text.
91. A seminal work in this area is Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Com-
mentaries, 28 BuFF. L. REV. 205 (1979).
92. As Jonathan Turley, The Hitchhiker's Guide to CLS, Unger, and Deep Thought, 81
Nw. U. L. REV. 593, 605 (1987), puts it:
A central CLS theme is that law is inherently nonneutral because language and
the interpretive process are themselves value-laden. The Crits argue that an
individual's political, social, and economic surroundings create a "context" that
limits and shapes the individual's "institutional or imaginative assumptions."
CLS is committed to demystification, and thereby transcendence, of texts
through an understanding of both the author's and interpreter's contextuality.
Id. (quoting UNGER, PASSION, supra note 81, at 7-8).
P. John Kozyris, In the Cauldron of Jurisprudence: The View From Within the Stew, 41 J.
LEGAL. EDUC. 421, 423 (1992), however, makes this critical comment about CLS, "[s]ome
brilliant scholars have been attracted to the movement, but the self-righteous and radical-chic
style of their argumentation (more often jeremiad than step-by-step reasoning) makes under-
standing and evaluation quite problematic."
93. See generally THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 81.
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rules, say the Crits, are based on nothing but ideologies of self-interest. As
one prominent CLS member has stated:
CLS is thus the form that modernism takes in legal thought. Like mod-
ernism in philosophy and sociology, it displaces settled understandings,
insisting that whatever we have is something we create and recreate
daily .... So, in part, the CLS program is justified in the way all
modernist programs are: The program consists of shattering congealed
forms of life by showing that they have no particular integrity. 94
D. DECONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING LIBERALISM
One congealed form of life that the Crits have attacked rather mercilessly
is liberalism.95 That outlook, as we have said, presumes that each person
should be free to pursue his or her own version of the good. But, as the Crits
point out, liberalism relies on legally-enforceable rights to make good that
postulate.
When rights conflict, someone's notion of the good must prevail while the
liberty of others is necessarily restricted. The cynical conclusion is that all
the "rights-talk" by Mill and his latter-day followers merely serves to mask
the triumph of one class over another.96 But if rights and other human con-
ventions are all infinitely malleable and ultimately quite arbitrary, what are
we left with? Roberto Unger, who has been hailed as the "Christ-figure" 97
of the Crits, says we can be animated by a "superliberal" "vocation of social
transformation" to create new legal institutions that will better nourish the
potential for human fulfillment.98
94. Tushnet, supra note 28, at 517.
95. For an exhaustive discussion of the Crits' critique of liberalism, see Hutchinson &
Monahan, supra note 81, at 1482-90. The authors however add this qualification:
But CLS does not seem committed to abandoning wholly the basic philosophical
value that is the source of the idea of a human right-the notion that individuals
are themselves independent sources of value. On the contrary, CLS acknowl-
edges that the "affirmation of free human subjectivity against the constraints of
group life" is one of the "liberating accomplishments of our culture."
Id. at 1488 (quoting Duncan Kennedy, Critical Labor Theory: A Comment, 4 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 503, 506 (1981)).
96. This essential insight of Critical Legal Studies is restated cogently by Gjerdingen,
supra note 77, at 413 (quoting UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS, supra note 81, at 83-88).
97. See supra note 81. That mockingly messianic metaphor is from Schwartz, supra note
81, at 416.
98. See Turley, supra note 92, at 608. Unger rejects what he calls the doctrine of objective
value inherent in Aristotelianism because it "tends to 'discover' the alleged universality in the
concrete and idiosyncratic institutions of its own particular social world." Hutchinson &
Monahan, supra note 81, at 1496 (quoting UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS, supra note
81, at 661).
Unger also claims that a theory of objective goods "degenerates into either meaningless
abstraction or unwarranted parochialism." UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS, supra note
81, at 239. Yet Unger's vision of the good is the realization that human nature will be revealed
in the "presence of shared values and genuine community." Hutchinson & Monahan, supra
note 81, at 1496.
Those views are ultimately quite close to the theories developed in this Article, particularly
to the idea that the acquisition of moral truth involves both a "making and a finding." See
infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text. In other words, when it comes to objective value,
there is a "middle ground between meaningless abstraction and unwarranted parochialism."
See John Finnis, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 30 AM. J. JURIS. 21, 41 (1985).
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Some like Bruce Ackerman and Frank Michelman have called in a more
circumscribed fashion for projects that would reconstruct liberalism. Acker-
man would revive the work of the Legal Realists. He speaks vaguely of "con-
structing a new language of power that does justice to the aspirations of
justice." 99 Michelman would promote civic republican virtues through a di-
alogic community.I°° Others have expressed similarly attractive views that
laws can be created or given meaning by a community. 10 Those commenta-
tors, however, premise their interpretive theories on a form of cultural rela-
tivism, 10 2 ultimately professing that there is no way to evaluate a belief or
practice other than by testing it against the way of life in which it is embed-
ded. But the Plessy Court followed prevailing racist attitudes in condoning
segregation and recent history has given us cultures that were even more
unspeakably evil. Were those belief systems legitimate foundations for the
legal rules of their societies? If so, then the law may rightfully be an instru-
ment of horrifying oppression.103
Perhaps dialogue among all members of society will be an effective protec-
tion against the potential for tyranny inherent in culturally-based legal sys-
tems. 104 But what if those discussions lead to no agreement on the common
good? Does that leave liberal individualism,105 with its fundamental contra-
dictions inevitably favoring one class over another, l°6 as the only acceptable
underpinning for law?
99. BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 4 (1983).
100. Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1510 (1988). But see Kelman,
supra note 81, at 14 who derides this notion of "interpretive community" by pointedly para-
phrasing the remarks of Paul Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982):
According to Paul Brest... even if such a unified community did exist, which it
doesn't, and even if everyone in it didn't carry within him contradictory maxims
and ideals that are available to resolve every controversy, the "community"
would consist of a bunch of stuffy old privileged white males, whose opinions
would scarcely be worth tossing onto a trash heap.
Kelman, supra note 81, at 14.
101. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 80; Feldman, supra note 87.
102. PERRY, supra note 80, at 38-54; Feldman, supra note 87, at 701-14.
103. Rorty himself has recognized the terrifying implications of cultural relativism in these
poetic remarks:
Suppose that Socrates was wrong, that we have not once seen the Truth, and so
will not, intuitively, recognize it when we see it again. This means that when the
secret police come, when the torturers violate the innocent, there is nothing to
be said to them of the form. "There is something within you which you are
betraying. Though you embody the practices of a totalitarian society which will
endure forever, there is something beyond those practices which condemns
you.,,
RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM xlii (1982).
In the same depressing vein are Sartre's comments, quoted by Rorty, that someday the
fascists may triumph, and that when such a time comes, "fascism will be the truth of man."
Id.
104. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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V. TOWARD A NEW NATURAL LAW
A. HUMAN GOODNESS AS THE STANDARD
As an alternative to either pure liberalism or cultural relativism, this Arti-
cle offers a different juridical foundation. It is one that might well arise from
a genuine dialogue among all members of a community working to find com-
mon ground for legal rules. This Archimedean point 10 7 is human goodness.
This theory has been best developed by several contemporary moralists
who draw on those foremost philosophers of the pre-modern world, Aris-
totle and St. Thomas Aquinas.10 8 These new thinkers, however, read Aris-
totle and St. Thomas Aquinas in the light of Kant and a more complex
understanding of Wittgenstein. These contemporary moral philosophers
part company with the non-cognitivists because they offer objective, non-
relative ethical theory that has truth value. Their propositions are secured
by a realistic epistemology that presents knowable moral concepts with con-
crete, descriptive contents. In the natural law tradition, their work offers the
possibility of grounding the law on the rational premises of justice.
B. JOHN FINNIS: NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
John Finnis can be credited with re-introducing natural law to the main-
stream of legal thought with his ground-breaking 1980 book Natural Law
and Natural Rights.10 9 Until that time, natural law theory was principally
the province of Roman Catholic philosophers from the neoscholastic tradi-
tion. 1 10 The linchpin of their theory was Aquinas' First Principle of Practi-
cal Reason: "Good is to be done and promoted and evil is to be avoided." 1 1
The neoscholastics took that principle as a moral norm presupposing a
speculative understanding of "human nature,"'1 12 a construct having its ori-
gins in the Stoic philosophers of the Hellenistic period."l 3 Human nature
properly understood, according to the neoscholastics, leads us to the correct
107. The term is borrowed from Hutchinson & Monahan, who remark:
The (CLS critique of rights) is enlightening to the extent that it highlights the
value-laden character of rights arguments and the ways in which rights reinforce
illegitimate hierarchies. But the unanswered foundational question of human
existence still lingers: what are the social conditions that best foster the develop-
ment of individual powers and potentials? The tension between the individual
and the community does not dissolve because of this recognition that there is no
Archimedean point from which to make a choice between competing values.
Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 81, at 1490 (emphasis added). This Article is an attempt
to answer that foundational question by identifying human goodness as just that Archimedean
point.
108. See RUSSELL HITTLINGER, A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW NATURAL LAW 2 (1987) (call-
ing this the "recoverist project").
109. JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
110. See Robert P. George, Recent Criticism of Natural Law Theory, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1371, 1379 (1988); see also Mensch & Freeman, supra note 78, at 966-85.
111. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, BASIC WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, VOL. TWo
774 (Anthony C. Pegis ed., 1945); SUMMA THEOLOGICA (1265-72) 1-2, question 94 art. 2.
112. George, supra note 110, at 1379.
113. See MARCUS TULIUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA 211 (Loeb ed., 1928); see also LLOYD
L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 35-42 (1987).
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end, which St. Thomas referred to as "Good." Doing good therefore means
conforming to the notion of well-being demanded by human nature. In
other words, once one identifies the content of human nature, moral princi-
ples become apparent.
Two important insights from modem thought, however, bedeviled the ne-
oscholastic interpretation of Aquinas's dictum. Its whole point was to infer
moral rules from factual statements about human nature, but Hume had
shown the apparent futility of drawing an "ought" from an "is."1114 Even
more troubling, the neoscholastic theory seemed to presuppose a direct
knowledge of human nature as a platonic ideal, unmediated by the influence
of our Kantian minds.1 15
Finnis's ingenious response was to turn from the outward construct of a
"human nature" to the inner experiences of each person's human inclina-
tions. 116 In doing this, he built on the groundbreaking work of philosophers
like Germain Grisez 17 and Victor Preller, 18 who had taken another look at
Aquinas in the mid-1960s and found a thinker who was more Kantian than
the neoscholastics had supposed.
Preller discovered that Aquinas's epistemology was not purely passive; it
entailed more than just the mind's "'taking a look' at the world."' 1 19 Aqui-
nas's version of the human intellect was really much more like Kant's.
Speaking of the human faculty that makes knowledge possible, Aquinas's
agent intellect, Preller said: "It is because of the natural power of the 'agent
intellect' to create intelligible forms that we are able to understand that
which we experience." 120
Grisez had similarly given a broader reading to Aquinas's First Principle
of Practical Reason. He discovered that it was not a moral imperative, as
the neoscholastics held, but merely a primitive description of human motiva-
tion. 12 1 According to Grisez, Aquinas was using the term "Good" without
specific moral content to mean simply whatever we pursue, whatever we un-
derstand to be worthwhile. 122
The dictum "Good is to be done and evil is to be avoided," thus under-
stood, means merely that human actions must have a point. The practical
intellect simply grasps certain ends as self-evident goals for human well-be-
ing. In Aquinas's words, those goods are per se nota,123 that is to say, under-
standing them is underived from any other knowledge. Finnis restated that
epistemological insight in this way: "[B]y a simple act of non-inferential
114. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
116. FINNIS, supra note 109, at 34.
117. Germain Grisez, The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the
Summa Theolgiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2, 10 NAT. L. F. 168 (1965).
118. VICTOR PRELLER, DIVINE SCIENCE AND THE SCIENCE OF GOD (1967).
119. Id. at 53
120. Id. at 55.
121. Grisez, supra note 117, at 190-201; see also George, supra note 110, at 1379.
122. Grisez, supra note 117, at 184.
123. AQUINAS, supra note 111; see Charles P. Nemeth, A Commentary on the Natural Law,
Moral Knowledge and Moral Application, 34 CATH. LAW. 227, 239 (1992).
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understanding one grasps that the object of the inclination which one exper-
iences is an instance of a general form of good, for oneself (and others like
one)." 124 Finnis then went on to delineate the basic forms of good which are
ultimately all aspects of human fulfillment. Following Grisez's interpreta-
tion of Aquinas, he did not present them as moral norms, but described
them as "evaluative substratum of moral judgments."' 125
Finnis's basic goods are the universal human values of life, knowledge,
play, aesthetic experience, sociability, and religion (religion understood in
the broadest sense as some purpose beyond one's own life).' 26 "Practical
reasonableness," the methodology to order one's life in pursuit of the basic
goods, is itself a basic good as well.127 According to Finnis, it involves
bringing "an intelligent and reasonable order into one's own actions and
habits and practical attitudes" in pursuit of those goals. 128
Again, Finnis's basic goods are not in themselves ethical principles, but
intrinsic aspects of human well-being and fulfillment. As such, however,
they are the fundamental reasons for human actions and they thus under-
write morality as the ultimate justifications for all our choices.
A non-cognitivist would question Finnis's claim that it is possible for the
practical intellect to grasp the basic goods in the data of human experience.
Aren't they, like all moral notions, just intuitions? 129 The skeptic will thus
doubt the universality of those claims and see all of Finnis's talk of "self-
evidence" as mere rhetoric masking personal or group preferences. For in-
stance, a non-cognitivist might challenge Finnis's assertion that sustenance is
a basic good. Without food, of course, one will die-but how can Finnis
prove that life is better than death? Finnis would answer that he cannot.
That proposition is non-demonstrable. Life is just a self-evident good. Any-
one with some sense about what it means to be human, 30 Finnis would say,
just knows that we all have a primal inclination to live which is self-
validating.
It is obvious, however, that reference to the basic goods will not resolve all
ethical or legal problems. An example involving Finnis and Grisez them-
selves quickly demonstrates that point. Although the two philosophers have
of late become collaborators,131 they differ on the morality of capital punish-
ment. Grisez sees it as contrary to the basic good of life, 132 but Finnis de-
124. FINNIS, supra note 109, at 34.
125. Id. at 59.
126. Id. at 85-90.
127. Id. at 100-03.
128. Id. at 88.
129. HITrINGER, supra note 108 (asserting that Finnis's attempt to describe basic human
goods without grounding them on a speculative philosophy of nature ends up as a type of
intuitionism that is an easy target for skeptics).
130. Perhaps this is what St. Thomas means when he says, "Some propositions are only
self-evident to the wise." AQUINAS, supra note 111, at 774.
131. See Germain Grisez et al., Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends, 32
AM. J. JURIS. 99 (1987) (restating and refining many of the points made by Finnis in NATU-
RAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 109).
132. GERMAIN GRISEZ & JOSEPH M. BOYLE JR., LIFE AND DEATH WITH LIBERTY AND
JUSTICE 400 (1979).
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fends the practice as a necessary aspect of justice. 133
Yet acceptance of certain basic goods does serve the important function of
providing a starting point for moral and legal discussion. In his comprehen-
sive work, Natural Law and Justice, Lloyd Weinreb comments on Finnis's
work to make that point:
Finnis suggests ways of thinking about purposeful human activity that
helps [sic] us to recognize how much agreement there is about human
ends and how properly to achieve them. This is a shelter from the
winds of moral relativism and an antidote to excessive skepticism.
Hard cases of moral uncertainty and conflict understandably attract our
attention, but they are so troubling partly because more often the moral
course is unproblematic. 134
C. MARTHA NUSSBAUM AND NON-RELATIVE VIRTUES
The second contemporary philosopher bucking the non-cognitivist trend
is Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum is a self-consciously devoted disciple of
Aquinas's mentor, that most worldly of all philosophers, Aristotle. She
reads Wittgenstein, like Aristotle, as rebelling against Plato's idealization of
philosophy. 135 This hostility to other-worldliness no doubt accounts for her
stated aversion to certain types of Christianity. 136 Yet lately she has been
writing of St. Thomas with approval, 137 and her theory of non-relative vir-
tues138 may just be the best contemporary restatement we have of Aquinas's
natural law. This Article first describes how Nussbaum offers Aristotle's
realistic epistemology for contemporary reconsideration. It then summa-
rizes her ethical theory and explains how it follows from her theory of
knowledge.
For Plato the real natures of things do not exist in the secular sphere, but
in an ideal realm. 139 Understanding truth, in his well-known metaphor,
means getting out of the cave that is our earthly existence and going up to
the transcendent sunlight where we can grasp those eternal structures. 14°
133. JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 130 (1983).
134. WEINREB, supra note 113, at 115.
135. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS 261 (1986).
136. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. But see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S
KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE (1990) and Martha C. Nussbaum,
A Reply to Stanley Hauerwas, 57 SOUNDINGS 765 (1989), where she writes sympathetically of
those forms of Christianity that present a human vision of God.
137. Martha C. Nussbaum & Hilary Putnam, Changing Aristotle's Mind, in MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM & AMELIE 0. RORTY, ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S DE ANIMA 51 (1992).
138. Martha C. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, 13 MIDWEST
STUDIES IN PHIL. 32 (1988).
Nussbaum's basic theory has been published several times more recently in MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM & AMARTYA SEN, THE QUALITY OF LIFE (1993); R. BRUCE DOUGLAS, LIBER-
ALISM AND THE GOOD (1990); and Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social
Justice, In Defense of Arisotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 202 (1992).
139. For a good discussion of this Platonic theory of "forms" and Aristotle's criticism of it,
see G.E.L. OWEN, LOGIC, SCIENCE, AND DIALECTIC: COLLECTED PAPERS IN GREEK PHI-
LOSOPHERS 155-79 (Martha Nussbaum ed., 1986). I am indebted to Professor Nussbaum for
directing me to that essay.
140. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 175 (Raymond Larson ed., 1979) (369-68 B.C.).
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Aristotle's theory of being is more earthbound. It focuses, as Nussbaum
tells us, on phainomena, a classical Greek word that has been translated as
"observed facts," but is better rendered as "appearances."' 14 1 For Aristotle
it is only in the ever-changing particular things of this world, as they appear
to us, that we can know any real form or structure. 142
Nussbaum's Aristotelian epistemology is thus anthropocentric. It is not
rooted in a platonic, "God's-eye" view of things as they exist in themselves,
but in life as we perceive it. Yet it is also realistic because it fully accepts
human understanding as truth in a way that is not relativistic. Nussbaum
describes this theory of knowledge as "insisting that truth is one for all
thinking, language-using beings."' 143 Or, as Aristotle wrote with his custom-
ary directness: "That which seems so to everyone, that we say is."' 44
A more subjective, skeptical attitude seems self-defeating and just not very
helpful to the business of being human. Descartes and Hume, at least as
they have been popularly understood, have taken us on a three-hundred year
detour from reality. Nussbaum thinks that Wittgenstein, at least in his later
years, shared that view. She quotes this passage with approval from his Re-
marks on the Foundations of Mathematics: "What we are supplying are re-
ally remarks on the natural history of man: not curiosities however, but
rather observations on facts which no-one has doubted, and which have only
gone unremarked because they are always before our eyes."' 145
Nussbaum premises her Aristotelian approach to morality on this realistic
epistemology. She wants to rescue ethics from Kantian abstractions and
make it sensitive to the actual circumstances of life, rooted in concrete
human experiences. 146 Her moral theory, thus, has a specific content. To
use an old-fashion term, it prescribes virtue.
Aristotle proposed a single, objective view of human good.147 But, aren't
rules for human conduct just based on the traditions or practices of particu-
lar groups? In our modem age, when the social sciences have demonstrated
the great diversity of cultural responses to the human condition, is it possible
to defend a system that posits universal ethical principles?
Nussbaum answers that there are indeed transcultural norms. Aristotle
gave us a morality that even today, she says, combines value content and
universality. 148 He did this by focusing on certain experiences that are com-
mon to all. Nussbaum describes these as "spheres of life within which all
141. NUSSBAUM, supra note 135, at 240.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 257.
144. Id. at 248 (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1172a36). By this, however,
Aristotle does not mean that universally-held beliefs are beyond criticism. In the same passage
Nussbaum points to Aristotle's remark: "Very rarely is truth a matter of majority vote." Id.
(quoting ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS 1009b2).
145. Id. at 264 (quoting LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF
MATHEMATICS 1 141).
146. Nussbaum, supra note 138, at 32-33.
147. Id. at 33.
148. Id. at 34.
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human beings regularly and more or less necessarily have dealings."' 149
Some prominent examples include (1) the fear of damage and loss, (2) the
bodily appetites, (3) the attitude a person has to others, and (4) the need for
humans to distribute limited resources. 150
For Aristotle, all humans have these and certain other experiences in com-
mon. Virtue is the disposition to choose and respond correctly in those cir-
cumstances. As Nussbaum points out, according to Aristotle there is a
particular course of action in each of those spheres that is proper in any
culture: 151 (1) As to fear, it is courage; (2) in the satisfaction of our bodily
appetites, the corresponding virtue is moderation; (3) in our attitude to
others, it is an inoffensive, easy grace and friendliness; and (4) as to the dis-
tribution of limited resources, the proper response is justice. 152 Other re-
sponses are, of course, possible, but they are wrong and vicious because they
do not promote a condition where humans can thrive and flourish.
But how can Aristotle be sure that those actions are the universally proper
ones and not just the precepts of a particular culture? Could they not
merely be the norms of behavior that ancient Athenian society prescribed for
its aristocrats? Nussbaum ultimately answers no, but she sees Aristotle as
recognizing more validity in that objection than has previously been sup-
posed. She points out that defining virtuous conduct was an on-going pro-
cess for Aristotle by noting his comment that in general, all humans seek
"not the way of their ancestors, but the good."' 153
In line with Aristotle's epistemology, Nussbaum additionally argues that
ethics does not exist in an idealized state, outside the fabric of human experi-
ence.154 Rather the wise and virtuous person has learned what it is to live
well from both tradition and from a lifetime of particular choices. 15 5 This
context-driven morality may explain the attraction of a feminist writer like
Linda Hirshman to Aristotle's theory.156
And in shaping a theory of virtue, due regard must be given to the re-
sponses of others to our shared experiences. It is our common humanity,
Nussbaum says, that makes morality a joint endeavor, inviting rational dis-
cussion among individuals and cultures. 157 As Aristotle wrote: "One may
observe in one's travels to distant countries the feelings of recognition and
affiliation that link every human being to every other human being."' 158
Nussbaum answers three objections to her theory of non-relative virtues.




153. Id. at 40 (quoting ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1268a39fl). Aristotle, however, had his own
moral blind spots, for instance; he vigorously defended slavery. ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE'S
POLITICS 58 (1254a15-30) (Modem Library ed. 1943).
154. Nussbaum, supra note 138, at 36.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Linda Hirshman, The Book of "A", 70 TEX. L. REV. 971 (1992). But see
Martha C. Nussbaum, Aristotle, Feminism and Needs for Functioning, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1019,
1019-20 (1992).
157. Nussbaum, supra note 138, at 33.
158. Id. at 32 (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1155a21-22).
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One comes immediately to mind. Maybe rational persons or cultures will
disagree on the appropriate response to a common human experience.' 59
Who then is to say which is right? Nussbaum concedes this, refusing to set
someone up as an ultimate arbiter to apodictically give us the only correct
mode of behavior. 160 Nussbaum would agree with Jeffrey Stout that in some
cases there may be more than one right answer. 16' But at least by applying
humanistic criteria to issues of proper conduct, Nussbaum says, we may be
able to eliminate some bad answers.162 She cannot resist illustrating that
point with this slap at Augustinian Christianity: "For example, if we should
succeed in ruling out conceptions of the proper attitude to one's own human
worth that are based on a notion of original sin, this would be moral work of
enormous significance, even if we got no further than that in specifying the
positive account."' 63
The second objection that Nussbaum recognizes cuts deeper into Aris-
totle's scheme. His common grounding experiences are intended to invite
universal moral judgments, but perhaps they themselves are just cultural
constructs?'" That opposing theory existed even in classical antiquity when
some of the Stoics doubted that there are standard human responses to pri-
vation.' 65 The Stoics went so far as to claim that babies do not directly
experience hunger or cold, but are conditioned to those sensations by paren-
tal responses to their cries.' 66 Of course, modem social science has taught
us much more about the way culture creates certain desires and
expectations.
But Nussbaum holds fast to the notion that there are universal aspects to
the human condition.' 67 And it is politicians who can, perhaps, make the
best case for such a notion.168 Politicians are, after all, the people who must
actually appeal to shared values in a transcultural framework.
One thinks of Jesse Jackson's eloquent call to "common ground," or per-
haps even more poetically, John Kennedy's American University speech in
which he reached across the gulf of the cold war. Inviting the Soviet Union
to begin disarmament talks, Kennedy made this moving case for the univer-
sal human need for peace: "[I]n the final analysis . . .we all inhabit the
[same] small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our chil-
dren's future. And we are all mortal."' 69
159. Id. at 39-40.
160. Id. at 43-45.
161. Id. at 43-44; see also infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
162. Nussbaum, supra note 138, at 43-44.
163. Id. at 44.
164. Id. at 40-42.
165. Id. at 42.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 46.
168. Aristotle, himself, held politicians in high regard: "For these two lives-the life of the
philosopher and the life of the statesman-appear to have been preferred by those who have
been most keen in the pursuit of virtue, both in our own and in other ages." ARISTOTLE,
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS, supra note 153, at 281 (1324a29-31).
169. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, JOHN F. KENNEDY 462 (1964) (Commence-
ment Address at American University, June 10, 1963).
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The third objection to Nussbaum's thesis is even more profound: Why
even talk about virtue?170 Is virtue not ultimately a response to the inade-
quacies of the human condition? Perhaps the Marxists are correct. Would
we not be better off if virtue were unnecessary? For example, if there were
no needy people, there would be no reason for the bourgeois virtue of
generosity.
Nussbaum cites Aristotle for the correct rebuttal to that utopian aspira-
tion.17 1 If we were gods, beings without limits, we would not have to talk
about virtue. 172 But such is not the case.
Well, can't we transform ourselves into such a state by changing the con-
ditions that underlie our lives? Roberto Unger holds out that possibility. 173
Certainly we can ameliorate some of the frustrating inadequacies of our cur-
rent situation by fashioning laws that are more just and a culture that is
more humane.
Ultimately, however, Nussbaum invokes Aristotle's perspective that such
radical transformations of human life will bring with them their own dire
consequences. 174 For better or worse we are limited beings, and a certain
tragedy seems to be our lot.175 Saint Thomas adds the gloss, "At least in this
life."' 176 So no matter how we couch our discussions about politics, law or
social policy, we will always be talking about morality and virtue.
D. JEFFREY STOUT AND ETHICS AFTER BABEL
Philosopher and social critic Jeffrey Stout dwells more deeply otn the di-
versity of moral beliefs and practices than Finnis or even Nussbaum. He
readily admits that there may be foundational disagreements in ethics among
various groups, and he is suspicious about theories that would resolve such
disputes by imposing a false unity. 177
In that regard he seems particularly weary of appeals to a transcultural
moral law. He accepts Wittgenstein's insight that all human knowledge is
bound up in the language and traditions that various peoples have created to
deal with the world.178 In his major work, Ethics After Babel, Stout repeat-
170. Nussbaum, supra note 138, at 42-43.
171. Id. at 50.
172. Id. (citing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1159a10-12, 1166a18-23).
173. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
174. Nussbaum, supra note 138, at 50.
175. The full statement of Nussbaum's opinion on this aspect of the human condition can
be found in her moving essay Transcending Humanity, in MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S
KNOWLEDGE 365 (1990).
176. AQUINAS, supra note 111, at 86-87. Saint Thomas writes:
Therefore neither is happiness, in its perfect nature, possible to man; but he
has a certain participation of it, even in this life. This seems to have been Aris-
totle's opinion about happiness.
Therefore man's ultimate happiness will consist in that knowledge of God
which the human mind possesses after this life.
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, ch. XLVIII.
177. JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL 13 (1988).
178. Id. at 63.
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edly rejects the notion that we can "look directly, without help from variable
tradition-bound presuppositions, at the Moral Law and then back again at
our beliefs, surveying the relations for instances or failures of
correspondence."1 79
Yet, like Nussbaum and Finnis, Stout questions the non-cognitivists' as-
sertion that we must abandon talk of moral truth. o80 Why, he asks, must the
understanding that our epistemic condition is embedded in diverse cultures
necessarily lead us to nihilism or even a type of ethical relativism that denies
the existence of objective truth?'"' For Stout, philosophy may not be able to
explain the nature of truth or even give exact criteria for it, but that does not
have to make us moral skeptics.
Then how can we establish the truth of certain propositions? Stout an-
swers that "all we have to go on in testing our moral beliefs is our own
culture's best view of what moral truth or justified moral belief consists
in."' 8 2 That, he says, helps explain a certain type of ethical relativism,
which holds that people in specific cultures can be justified in believing that a
particular practice is moral when, objectively, it is not.' 83 To support his
point, Stout gives the example of slavery, an institution that he is willing to
condemn as morally wrong at all times and in all places.' 8 4 The pervasive
belief-system of a particular age may render individual slaveholders blame-
less, says Stout, but it does not make their actions proper.'8 5
In all our culturally-constructed knowledge then, Stout firmly holds out
the possibility of searching for moral truth that is real and objective.'8 6
Even though he calls this approach a "modest pragmatism,"'' 8 7 he is willing
to join the school of natural law which he says is just a fancy name for all
moral truth known or unknown. 88 Stout even says, in so many words, that
certain ethical statements are self-evident:
Some propositions acquire a kind of epistemic authority that needs no
support from recitation of justifying reasons or demonstrations of truth
.... In fact, as Wittgenstein pointed out, there are many propositions
that we are justified in believing but wouldn't know how to justify. 8 9
We may be trapped, as Nietzsche says, in our own language, but it is
hardly a prison house. And our moral judgments are more than mere intu-
itions. There is, in Stout's words, a "logical space of moral language, relying
on standards of appraisal and patterns of authority."' 90 This moral lan-
guage has been established by the opinions of those we deem to be competent
179. Id. at 22-23.
180. Id. at 21-32.
181. Id. at 21.
182. Id. at 23.
183. Id. at 21-32.
184. Id. at 21-22.
185. Id. at 22.
186. Id. at 250.
187. Id. at 249-50.
188. Id. at 22.
189. Id. at 35.
190. Id. at 39.
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moral judges and by the actions of those we recognize as virtuous persons. 191
There we can take our stand and make moral judgments with objectivity.
For Stout, moral truth is thus both "found" and "made." He holds that
there are objectively true propositions that we can discover. 192 Those
truths, however, are brought into being by creative human efforts, by our
attempts through language and culture to shape the world into an environ-
ment that has meaning for us.
Stout describes this process of finding and making moral truth with a
French word, bricolage, which he loosely translates as a collecting of odds
and ends that can be refashioned to meet a future need. 193 For Stout, this
bespeaks: "every moralist's need to engage in selective retrieval and eclectic
configuration of traditional linguistic elements in hope of solving problems at
hand."' 194 He singles out Aquinas as a quintessential practitioner of that art,
cobbling together fragments of various philosophies ("Platonic, Stoic, Pau-
line, Jewish, Islamic, Augustinian and Aristotelian") in a way that created a
new moral language, a new and improved natural law theory. 195
Stout asserts that this melding process occurs when two different cultures
enter into dialogue.196 He even adds a note of universality by observing that
it is possible to "make sense of all extant moral languages as members of a
single family connected by intelligible relations of family resemblance."' 197
Stout even squares this all-embracing notion of a single true morality with
the very real ethical differences that he concedes have arisen in various cul-
tures. 198 An adequate moral system, he says, could be "the set of all true
fully interpreted moral sentences in all possible moral languages."' 199
But what of conflicts in moral systems? Perhaps two ways of life, says
Stout, could be judged as "equally true or adequate. '' 2°° It does not follow,
however, that anything goes. Stout sums up his quite elastic but ultimately
non-relative, morality with this poetic admonition:
Tolerate genuinely good ways of life . . . , but don't tolerate just any
system of rules that manages to catch on within some group as a mecha-
nism for managing internal or interpersonal conflict while satisfying its
own, perhaps evil, moral ideal. Let a thousand flowers bloom, but keep
killing weeds.201
But what are the consequences of Stout's modest pragmatism when ap-
plied to social theory and, ultimately, to law? Stout does hold to a concept of
the "good," but it is decidedly non-utopian. As he starkly puts it: "We can
all dream of what life would be like in a world united in a perfect rational
191. Id. at 39-40.
192. Id. at 77.
193. Id. at 294.
194. Id. at 293.
195. Id. at 76.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 70.
198. Id. at 91-105.
199. Id. at 97.




consensus on the good, but this dream represents no accessible alternative to
what we have now." 202 For Stout, rather, we must look to what is "achieva-
ble under our social-historical circumstances by acceptable means." 20 3
We may have a common notion of the good, says Stout, but it is a rather
thin one.2°4 The exigencies of contemporary society, with all its moral di-
versity, lead us to accept liberal virtues like "tolerance" as essential if we are
all going to live together in some type of civil peace. So let our concept of
the good be one that is "self-consciously provisional and contextually sensi-
tive," he says. 205
Stout questions if this is really very far from Aristotle's ideal of a commu-
nity seeking the good.206 Perhaps Aristotle only required that members of
his polis share enough agreement to make a discussion of justice possible.20 7
Citing his notion of bricolage, Stout suggests that we refashion Aristotle's
ideal of the common good for our time just as Aquinas "baptized the same
pagan vocabularies for use in Christian ethics. '208 Stout would thus not
oppose the notion of moral truth to the ideals of liberalism, but would en-
courage social critics and lawgivers to find the right principles in the numer-
ous particular cases that arise daily. After all, is this not exactly what
Aristotle insists be done-that we find truth in the appearances of things
with the guidance of practical reasonableness?
Stout distinguishes his theory from a "vulgar pragmatism," where all of
our choices are only grounded a la Bentham on some instrumental reasoning
like cost-benefit analysis. 20 9 He would make that just one language, one of a
number of acceptable approaches. Stout's modest pragmatism is thus anti-
reductionist; it is willing to make use of all kinds of arguments. Although
his pragmatism shrinks from claiming privileged insights into the nature of
reality, it will not hesitate to use any justified beliefs drawn from observa-
tion. Stout is, therefore, always willing to entertain new moral languages
that eventually lead to new truths-"truths that pay their way by serving as
rules for action. ''210
E. ANOTHER LOOK AT THE SUPREME COURT AND MORAL TRUTH
This Article began by asking whether there are such things as moral
truths and, if so, whether they can validly serve as premises for legal rulings.
Specifically, the Article sought to defend the implicit assertion of the
Planned Parenthood plurality that racial segregation was just as objectively
wrong in the late 19th Century as it was in 1954 or is now.211
202. Id. at 224.
203. Id. at 226.
204. Id. at 225.
205. Id. at 238.
206. Id. at 239.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 241.
209. Id. at 264.
210. Id. at 262.
211. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
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Brown v. Board of Education,212 the 1954 decision where the Court out-
lawed legislated segregation in education, has not been without controversy.
Some have expressed misgivings about the sociological studies used by the
Court to support its opinion. 213 Others have doubted Brown's effectiveness
in desegregating schools. 214 Recently, Critical Race Theory has questioned
whether integration is even necessary or desirable for African-Americans. 215
Those issues are beyond the scope of this Article. Whatever the actual
consequences of Brown, its moral statement is clear. Legislated segregation
is wrong because it brands a group of people as inferior and therefore denies
them the equal dignity to which all humans are entitled. Anyone who dis-
puted that today would not be taken seriously.
But can that proposition be defended as an objective truth supporting
Planned Parenthood's dictum that legislated segregation was always wrong?
In late 19th century America the Supreme Court, supported presumably by
a majority of society, may well have believed that certain groups of citizens
were inferior to others. Whatever its view on human equality, the Court in
Plessy recognized no degrading effects in the practice of segregation.
Notwithstanding such suggestions of ethical relativity, Finnis, Nussbaum,
and Stout all make convincing cases that we are capable of the type of moral
knowledge that the Planned Parenthood plurality saw as informing Brown.
The core arguments of those philosophers can be marshalled to support the
unchanging principles underlying that landmark decision.
For Finnis, as we have said, there are certain basic goods that are self-
212. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
213. See, e.g., Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (1955); Ernest Van
den Haag, Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases-A Reply to Professor Kenneth
Clark, 6 VILL. L. REV. 69 (1960), who questioned Brown's use of several studies purporting to
show that black children considered themselves inferior to white children. Chief among those
studies were tests reported by Kenneth B. Clark demonstrating that black children preferred
white dolls to black dolls. Brown cited that as "modern authority" for the proposition that
segregation has a tendency to retard the educational and mental development of Black chil-
dren. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
Professor Cahn's criticism was, in essence, that the use of those reports was a "flimsy foun-
dation" for the Brown opinion when the cruelty inherent in racial segregation was "obvious
and evident." Cahn, supra, at 158-59.
214. See, e.g., L.A. Powe, Jr., The Road to Swan: Mobile County Crawls to the Bus, 51
TEX. L. REV. 505 (1973) (describing how the Mobile County school system in Alabama
avoided desegregation until the Supreme Court approved court-ordered busing in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Brd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)).
Of more recent relevance is this report: "Meaningful progress in the integration of public
schools for black children has not happened since the early 1970's, and in the twenty-five
largest inner-city school districts there are actually more racially segregated schools today than
existed in 1954." Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285,
1285 (1992) (citations omitted).
The United States Supreme Court still finds itself having to enforce the holding of Brown.
See United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992) (holding that Mississippi's plans to dis-
mantle the effects of de jure segregation in its public university system were inadequate).
215. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Se-
curing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129
(1992); Jarvis, supra note 214, at 1287 (arguing that "the implementation of an Afrocentric
curriculum that seeks to enhance the self-esteem and academic performance of Black children
is consistent with Brown").
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evident aspects of human well-being. Those goods form the grounding and
justification for our evaluative judgments. Segregation that is legislatively
imposed upon a racial minority obviously stigmatizes the minority and de-
nies them the ability to thrive and prosper. 216 It strips them of certain intan-
gible goods like respect and fair treatment, which are necessary to social
fulfillment. In addition, legislated segregation will almost certainly deprive
the minority members of a fair share of economic and educational opportu-
nities. Without those concrete resources, members of minority groups are
indisputably hindered in obtaining the basic goods of sustenance and knowl-
edge. As such, legislated segregation is wrong and immoral.
Like Finnis, Nussbaum presents a realistic theory of knowledge that she
roots in the common understanding of all "thinking, language-using peo-
ple." For her, such an anthropocentric observation of the human condition
reveals transcultural, universal experiences. Moral judgment is the ability to
act worthily, to seek the good, in each of those shared spheres of life.
The universality of our condition thus gives rise to an understanding that
other humans are entitled to be treated fairly and equally. We therefore
come to know that in our dealings with others, the most essentially appropri-
ate response is justice-giving each person what he or she is due. Any laws
that lack that cardinal attribute are vicious and must be condemned.
In much the same way as Nussbaum, Stout describes the acquisition of
moral knowledge as both a finding and a making. Humans interact with
their world, discovering truths that are justified by legitimate standards of
authority. In that process certain ethical statements even gain such episte-
mic authority that they become self-evidently true and need no defense. The
immorality of legislated segregation easily qualifies as such a proposition
today.
But that was not always so. One should not be quick to excuse the Jus-
tices in Plessy, but perhaps some of them were acting in good faith, misled by
the racist culture of late nineteenth century America. Nevertheless, that
does not make their decision moral. As the Planned Parenthood plurality
said, Plessy was wrong the day it was decided. 217
Stout does, however, hold out the possibility that through linguistic and
cultural changes humans who previously could not recognize certain moral
truths can come to understand them. Since this process involves to some
extent the creation of new truths, our claims to moral knowledge must al-
ways be "self-consciously provisional and contextually sensitive," he says.
Yet grounded in our human framework, they can still be real and objective.
Legal reasoning consists in just such a process of making and finding
truth. It justifies conclusions by both appeals to accepted principles and new
arguments that better fit specific circumstances. With such expanded moral
216. Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2743, decided just
three days before Planned Parenthood, made reference to the "lost educational and career
opportunities and stigmatic harms caused by discriminatory educational systems."
217. A similar judgment should be made on Aristotle's blatantly immoral defense of slav-
ery. See supra note 153.
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knowledge today's Supreme Court, Stout would say, can state that racial
segregation was just as objectively wrong in the late 19th century as it was in
1954 or is now.
VI. CONCLUSION
Legal rulings can thus be grounded on objective principles, and the prac-
tice of law can be more than "a game of easy analogies. ' 218 It can be a
search for moral truth and an application of it to human affairs.
This outlook should be particularly attractive to lawyers and others who
serve the law for it promises them a palpable sense of purpose in their
work-the finding and making of justice. Even more significantly, this per-
spective can win renewed respect for our legal system from a disillusioned
society. Aristotle, the ancient advocate of moral truth, should fittingly have
the final word on that important goal: "But justice is the bond of people in
states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is
just, is the principle of order in political society. ' 219
218. ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 8 (1986). Un-
ger's famous phrase is contained in these remarks, which can be taken as a recognition that law
must be grounded in moral truth:
Every branch of doctrine must rely tacitly if not explicitly upon some picture of
the forms of human association that are right and realistic in the areas of social
life with which it deals. . . . Without such a guiding vision, legal reasoning
seems condemned to a game of easy analogies. It will always be possible to find,
retrospectively, more or less convincing ways to make a set of distinctions, or
failures to distinguish, look credible.
Id. (emphasis added)
219. ARISTOTLE, supra note 153, at 55 (1253a37-40).
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